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ABSTRACT: Recent work linking feminist epistemology with social epistemology draws attention to the
role of status and power in understanding knowledge and reasoning in social context. I argue that
considerations of social justice require better understandings of two particular components of reasoning and
social context: (i) abstraction—who gets to abstract, how, and why? (ii) the individual-social distinction—
how do particular understandings of this distinction serve to minimize or elucidate the role of status and
power?
KEYWORDS: feminist epistemology, reasoning, context, abstraction, individual-social distinction, social
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Significant developments in feminist epistemology and social epistemology have drawn
attention to the importance of examinations of social and cultural context in the
development of enhanced understandings of knowledge, reasoning, and logic. Feminist
epistemology is regularly understood as a form of social epistemology, one that places
special emphasis on the epistemic workings of gender and other politically-sensitive
social divisions. Feminist epistemologists focus particularly on forms of social identity
that interact with locally salient forms of power and status that may, in turn, inform
conceptions of knowledge, reasoning, and logic. However, the particular focus on
understanding the epistemic workings of power and status that feminist theorists develop
places their work at odds somewhat (in dissensus perhaps) with many projects in social
epistemology that encompass the social as a relatively apolitical realm. I want to
elaborate on this tension and, in particular, examine some of the ways in which feminist
work that takes account of power/status uniquely contributes to theoretical
understandings of cognition, reasoning, and logic. I will argue, in particular, that this
work motivates (among other things) specific reconsiderations of two important
concepts--and related distinctions--that inform work on cognition, reasoning, logic, and
social context: abstraction or the abstract (as that is contrasted with the concrete, the
particulars of context); and the social (as that is distinguished from the individual).
It is important to understand the term feminist here as something like an umbrella
term that includes a range of projects. While many earlier projects in feminist theorizing
took gender (as demarcated primarily by sex differences) to be the central concept for
analysis, it soon became clear that the concept needed to be refined and extended in
various ways. For example, it became evident that gender could not be examined in
isolation from race, class, and other salient social and cultural differences that inform
social identity and, indeed, inform the ways in which gender impacts individual
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experience and identity in a given social context. Social identity can be understood in
terms of differences in experiences and behavior. Yet since there are innumerable ways in
which any one individual differs from another, differences and identity can be examined
along various axes of significance, some of which reveal the workings of power and
status and some of which may not.
Earlier psychological analyses also tended to treat gender as an attribute of
individuals, with gender differences understood in terms of differences in relatively stable
intrapsychic psychological and behavioral traits. More recent feminist work in cognitive
psychology has drawn attention to the situational nature of gender which prompts more
refined understandings of “situated cognition.” Even in laboratory settings with tests of
what I call IISAP-cognition (isolated-individual-solving-a puzzle-cognition), gender
differences can appear and disappear depending on the particular social effects,
associations, and expectations prompted by changes in test formats and test instructions.
(Sharps et al. 1993, Deaux 1984, Rooney 1995) Postmodern and rhetorical analyses of
gender have also revealed its workings as a symbolic and discursive formation. For
example, in the history of philosophy reason was often valued through an implicit, if not
explicit, contrast with the lower-status realm of emotion, particulars, and embodiment
that was metaphorically, if not literally, cast as the realm of the “feminine.” (Rooney
1991) In the following I will draw on these more recent expanded understandings of
gender, that is, gender understood as a social and symbolic formation linked to power
and status. I am especially interested in the ways in which these expanded understandings
of gender motivate enhanced understandings of reasoning and social and political
context.
The relatively well-know case of gender and moral reasoning provides a helpful
illustration of what is at issue here. Carol Gilligan’s 1982 work In a Different Voice
provided the catalyst for significant debate in feminist psychology and feminist
philosophy especially. Gilligan herself and many of her commentators regularly framed
different moral voices in terms of gender differences in reasoning (“care reasoning” and
“justice reasoning”) which drew on a particular understanding of the abstract versus
context/concrete distinction. Not uncommon is Marilyn Friedman’s description of the
difference:
the standard, more typically “male,” moral voice...derives moral judgments about particular cases
from abstract, universalized moral rules and principles that are substantively concerned with
justice and rights. ... By contrast, the different, more characteristically “female,” moral voice that
Gilligan heard in her studies eschews abstract rules and principles...[it] derives moral judgments
from the contextual detail of situations grasped as specific and unique... the motivating vision of
this ethics is “that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or
hurt.” (Friedman 1993, p. 92, my emphasis)

As I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Rooney 2001) one needs to be careful about
reading or “hearing” differences in terms of a distinction (abstract versus contextual) that
draws on, rather than challenges, a philosophical history of reason that inspired rather
than challenged sexism spelled out in terms of “fundamental” cognitive differences. For
instance, Schopenhauer noted: “For it is just because [women’s] reasoning power is weak
that present circumstances have such a hold over them, and those concrete things which
lie directly before their eyes exercise a power which is seldom counteracted to any extent
by abstract principles of thought, fixed rules of conduct... or regard of what is absent and
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remote.” (Mahowald 1994, 138). If there are some differences emerging in the moral
voices of women and men (and there has been considerable debate about the existence or
significance of such) one could alternatively read them in terms of the application of
different kinds of universal and abstract principles. One could well argue that what
Friedman calls the “motivating vision” of the care ethic is a universal principle, perhaps
even an abstract one. The meaning of the term “abstract” is not as transparent as is often
assumed in these discussions. Abstraction is surely something of a relative or contextual
notion--as when we abstract from some of the specifics or saliencies of a given situation,
and not others. Abstracting from a moral situation with respect to the kinds of
relationships among individuals in it, and not with respect to specific juridical rights of
those individuals as autonomous agents, is one way of abstracting from the situation, as is
the way that abstracts with respect to the latter and not the former. It is, unfortunately, the
traditional affinity between conceptions or idealizations of “maleness” and rationality
(typically fleshed in terms of principles, autonomy, and abstraction) that seems to
automatically lend voice to certain ways of reading gender differences in these contexts
and not alternative ways that, I am suggesting, are just as plausible. What I am arguing
for here is a feminist reading that troubles traditional conceptions of abstraction linked to
a particular aspect of the symbolic formation of gender-- the traditional “masculine”
reach of reason was regularly posited as the superior cognitive mode through a contrast
with, and abstraction from, the clearly “lower status” world of particulars and
embodiment which was regularly symbolized as “feminine” (Rooney 1991,1994)
The particular interrogation of abstraction that I promote here also connects to the
debate generated by Andrea Nye’s influential work, Words of Power: A Feminist Reading
of the History of Logic (1990). Nye’s examination of historical developments in logic
uncovers aspects of their discursive constructions as “words of power” that legitimate
some ways of thinking and speaking as authoritative and others as not. In many cases
Nye sees the feminist problem with logic as “the problem of abstraction”—the problem
of privileging formal abstraction as the superior mode of thought, thus dismissing or
erasing the content and context of real everyday utterances. However, there is a tendency
for Nye (among others) to, again, treat the abstract-context distinction (which she
connects with the form-content distinction) as a meaningful distinction without giving
due attention to the ways in which its meaningfulness draws on its gender-inflected
discursive history. She then tends to identify the feminist problem of logic with the
problem of abstraction, to the point that she questions whether there even could be a
feminist reform of logic.
In her discussion of Nye’s work Marjorie Hass (1999) takes issue with Nye’s
understanding of logic and abstraction and her tendency to hold up natural language(s) as
logic’s purer other. Addressing patterns of discrimination in particular experience, Hass
argues, often requires specific forms of generality and abstraction. For instance, feminist
criticism of cultural and social norms often requires abstraction from particular
relationships or particular linguistic systems. Hass does not deny that there are problems
with abstraction in some contexts—not recognizing individual differences, for instance,
but she adds: “In aiming to avoid the recognizable problems with abstractions, we must
not imagine that we can retreat into a “purer,” fully concrete form of description…natural
language itself requires a form of generality that produces anew the problem of
abstraction.” (1999, 193) Hass presents a more nuanced approach to abstraction that is
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reflected also in her consideration of alternative logics which may enable “new
representation of generality that are respectful of difference.” (194) Val Plumwood
stresses a similar point in relation to feminist critiques of logic:
Once the plurality of logical systems has been acknowledged, feminist and other social critique
can be more discriminating in its response to logics, and begin an exploration of the way in which
different logical systems correspond to different forms of rationality. We can begin to understand
systems of logic and their corresponding systems of rationality as selected… I shall show that an
understanding of the way selection has operated to privilege certain of these forms of rationality
has much to contribute to an understanding of the deep roots of phallocentrism and other
oppressive conceptual structures in Western thought, and that we can find in the selection of
logical systems the same marks of elite perspectives which have been widely demonstrated
elsewhere for supposedly neutral and universal forms of knowledge. (2002, 17)

(Plumwood then proceeds to undertake a specific examination of negation in classical
logic--in particular, its relation to hierarchical dualisms and what she calls the “logic of
domination.”) Thus, for both Hass and Plumwood the “political” questions are not
primarily about the privileging of abstraction or logic over context and particularity, but,
instead, are about the privileging of particular forms of abstraction or logic over others.
Given that there are numerous ways in which one might abstract from and reason about a
given context or situation, questions then arise about who gets to abstract and why, as
well as questions about which particular aspects of social contexts individual forms of
abstraction reveal and which aspects they render invisible or “illogical.” How, in
particular, do supposedly neutral and universal forms of logic and knowledge reflect elite
perspectives, where these perspectives are understood as particular social perspectives
informed by status and power?
These recommendations for politically-sensitive attention to contexts and
situations and the various ways in which one might abstract from them necessitate, I
maintain, a particular feminist examination of the social (as that is distinguished from the
individual), especially since that has also been a significant distinction in the history of
epistemology. Most, arguably all, contexts and situations are social ones which can be
experienced and understood quite differently by people whose identities place them in
different social locations--even within the same situation. (What may seem to be a
harmless joke to one person in a given context may be offensive sexism or racism to
another, for instance.) As we have seen, expanded understandings of gender as a social
and symbolic formation (that impacts epistemological as well as economic and
institutional structures) challenges uncritical feminist rejections of abstraction as
“masculine.” So too must such understandings reject an uncritical endorsement of the
social as “feminine.” In particular, I will argue that a more critical examination of the
individual-social distinction as a gender-inflicted one must also inform accounts of what
is especially significant about feminist epistemology and feminist perspectives on logic,
including what distinguishes this work from many projects in “regular” social
epistemology. The individual versus social and abstract versus concrete/context
distinctions are not the same, of course, but there are significant links between them in
traditional epistemology. Many forms of epistemic individualism which take individual
knowers as the primary epistemic agents construct those agents as generic subjects with
generic capacities to abstract and reason about the “core” meaning and epistemic
structure of particular, socially-imbued knowledge contexts and situations.
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Recognizing that the individual-social distinction has also been a gender-linked
one doesn’t simply mean noting that women’s individuality was often negated or
discouraged, that women’s nature was thought to be more relational and social than
men’s, or that women’s roles were regularly bound up with familial and social nurturance
in ways that men’s were less likely to be (though this has often been the case). Quite
significantly, it also means that philosophical norms or ideals of “individual” expression
and endeavor were regularly mapped out and theorized in terms of male activities and
choices in the public realms of work and politics, or in the “private” domain of solitary
thought, undistracted by the changing particularities of social involvement. It should be
noted here, of course, that philosophical associations and ideals of male-inflected identity
and individuality regularly applied only to men of more privileged classes. Thus, insofar
as gender associations informed traditional understandings of the individual and the
social, a critical rethinking of these gender associations must also be part of feminist
reflections on the individual and social in thinking about knowledge, reasoning, and
epistemology. As is the case with other gender-linked dichotomies, we are cautioned
against a general endorsement of the social (as “female” or “feminine”) over the
individual (which is cast as “male” or masculinist) when that runs the risk of reinforcing
those gender associations and any related sexist assumptions.
Epistemic individualism, as noted above, usually includes the methodological
strategy of taking individuals to be the primary knowers or primary epistemic subjects.
Traditionally, ideal knowers are generic and interchangeable, with common generic
capacities of reasoning and sense perception. Specifics of social or cultural location—
related to gender, socio-economic class, religious background, or else—are not
considered pertinent in epistemological investigations. However, feminist and other work
that is politically sensitive to specifics of cultural location and difference challenges this
division. In a word, such work troubles the notion that “the social” can be assessed as
something like an add on to “the individual” (a notion not uncommon in social
epistemology particularly). Or, to put it another way, this work challenges the notion that,
given the numerous factors that can go into cognition, understanding, reasoning, and
knowledge, we can readily divide these into “individual” factors and “social” factors. The
idea that the social infuses the individual constitutes a recurring them in the examples
from feminist philosophical work I now proceed to examine. The first examples are
drawn from feminist examinations of the connections between particular understandings
of individualism and historically- and culturally-specific understandings of masculinity-this work helps to situate specific conceptions of epistemic individualism within broader
cultural understandings of individualism. The later examples pertain to specific
conceptions of epistemic individualism at the other end of the spectrum, so to speak.
These connect back to the examples above relating to abstraction: they draw attention to
accounts of individual reasoning understood in terms of abstraction and completion of
specific logical/cognitive tasks.
Feminist work on Descartes provides important insights into the way in which the
philosophical understandings of epistemic individualism can reflect broader historical and
cultural moments. Both Susan Bordo (1987) and Naomi Scheman (1993) note the
relationship between Descartes’ individualism and his skepticism, a relationship they
both argue lends itself to particular psycho-cultural readings. Profound changes in the
world of knowledge at the beginning of the scientific revolution, Bordo argues, provide
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something of a backdrop to the psychologically-inflected themes of uncertainty,
instability, anxiety, and needs for foundations and certainty that motivate Descartes’
work. Though elaborated somewhat differently, Scheman also presents a psycho-cultural
readings of Descartes’ fears of embodiment and dependence on other people as threats to
certain knowledge. These readings provide insight into Descartes’ epistemology,
certainly, but they also encourage us to reflect on what has motivated the compelling grip
that his work has had on so many epistemologists who have taken his stark individualism
and skepticism as a kind of starting point in epistemology. They thus challenge many
standard analyses of Descartes which take his arguments as “timeless, culturally
disembodied events in some history of ‘talking heads’.” (Bordo 1987, 3) There has been
some debate about Bordo’s and Scheman’s attributions of “masculinity” to Descartes’
epistemic individualism—whether, for instance, an endorsement of object-relations
theory is required to ground such attributions. But what is perhaps more to the point here
is the way in which these interrogations into specifics of historical and cultural
background (whether these specifics relate directly or only tangentially to
contemporaneous understandings of ideal masculinity) shed light on the way in which
larger social understandings situate specific conceptions of individualism and the hold
those conceptions have on theorists who adopt them.
One can make similar arguments about a potentially misleading narrow focus on
gender and masculinity in discussions about the epistemic individualism of the traditional
moral reasoner. Many feminists have argued that this “justice reasoner” also
encompassed problematic levels of individualism, in this case fleshed out in terms of
autonomous and independent principles reasoning, as we noted above. Linda Nicholson
has argued for both historical and cross-cultural analyses in order to better understand the
“justice reasoner” as a conceptual product of modern Western capitalist society and the
specific forms of public reason it endorses. (1999) In particular, she argues that
insufficient critical attention has been given to the ways in which Kohlberg’s conceptions
of progress (in his notion of “moral progress”) and abstraction incorporate culturally
specific meanings. Similarly, many feminist theorists now question the cultural
assumptions embedded in traditional understandings of abstraction and reasoning that led
previous researchers to conclude, for instance, that non-western children were doing “less
well” on some of Piaget’s cognitive tests than western children were. As we have noted
earlier, greater sensitivity to the socially and culturally varied ways in which people can
interpret, understand, abstract from, and reason about situations and problems elicits
caution about rank ordering comparisons of intelligence or rationality across different
cultural contexts. In addition, feminist work in cognitive psychology which draws
attention to the situational nature of gender (linked to understandings of gender as a
social formation) also lends support to politically-sensitive analyses of situated cognition.
Cognitive psychologists and argumentation theorists who design studies of
specific types of reasoning and logical inference encounter some of the same kinds of
concerns about how to more precisely demarcate the steps involved in completing
specific reasoning tasks—including those that seem to be well-defined and selfcontained. There isn’t uniform agreement among these researchers about what
distinguishes reasoning from productive thinking, for instance. Reasoning can include
problem-solving and decision-making and can be assessed with a variety of specific
tasks: verbal analogies, categorical syllogisms, or series completion problems, among
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others. (Galotti 1989) In addition, modeling the precise sequence of steps involved with
specific reasoning tasks poses something of a challenge, since people can interpret or
“encode” the given premises differently, or they can draw differently from assumptions
and associations in their background knowledge. Cross-cultural studies and studies
comparing “schooled” and “unschooled” adults reveal interesting results. One study, in
particular, indicated that unschooled adults “failed to accept the logical task” as given.
Kathleen Galotti comments on this study as follows: “These adults alter, omit, or add to
the premises supplied, in order to make the problems more consonant with their own
knowledge bases and beliefs about the nature of the task… [yet] from their own
‘translation’ of the premises, they reason elegantly and logically... at least some of the
variables that influence reasoning, then, have to do with the context in which the task
occurs.” (Galotti, 337) These studies thus suggest that schooling often involves training
people into a particular way of understanding or interpreting problems, premises, and
reasoning steps. This may be only one way among many, and, as we saw earlier, some
ways of abstracting and carrying out the “core” reasoning task may reflect the
background knowledge bases and cultural experiences of specific subgroups over others.
The distinction in philosophy between formal and informal logic (very familiar to people
at this conference) has, unfortunately, often been used,by formal logicians particularly, to
promote the idea that formal logic captures “pure” or “core” reasoning or rationality,
which is valued over the “everyday” or “practical” reasoning that informal logicians
attend to. Yet, formal logic (particularly in deductive reasoning) at best captures only one
relatively limited way of abstracting from situations or problems--that is, with respect to
preserving truth in logical inferences involving propositions of a particular form.
Cross-cultural studies of a variety of cognitive tasks, as well as studies that are
sensitive to the political and social-situational nature of gender, thus challenge particular
understandings of both the abstract-context and the individual-social distinctions in logic
(philosophy of logic) and in epistemology. Understandings of the cognitive “individual”
have traditionally been bound up with assessments of a neutral “rational” core, as when
cognition is theorized in terms of specific steps in abstracting and reasoning that any
(generic) individual person can perform in completing “the” cognitive task at hand. The
“social” (as regularly presented in social epistemology, for instance) is then treated as
something like the penumbra surrounding this rational core—the social context may
provide data, knowledge gathering tasks may be socially shared, and so on, but the core
reasoning structure remains, ideally, neutral and similarly available to the individual
reasoners/knowers involved. Clearly more work needs to be done in order to arrive at
better understandings of the ways in which politically-inflected aspects of the social and
cultural inform specific and individual reasoning activities. The kinds of feminist critical
reformulations of the abstract-context and individual-social distinctions that I have
examined must, however, be a necessary part of any epistemological or logical project
that aims to take full account of diversity in reasoning and knowing, not to mention a full
account of the social and political in all their epistemic manifestations.
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